Quick answer: Six practical controls for AI agent credentials are to reduce exposure, restrict provider permissions and retrieval separately, log retrieval attempts, revoke safely, identify agents individually, and review access against current tasks. Each control needs a verification step and a clear statement of what it does not protect.
This is an operating checklist. For the underlying components, read secrets management architecture for AI agents. For assigning owners and managing access over time, use the credential-management lifecycle.
1. Keep credentials out of source code and prompts
Action: Remove provider keys from committed files, agent instructions and chat messages. Retrieve them through an authenticated runtime integration rather than asking someone to paste them into a conversation.
Verify: Inspect configuration, representative tool responses and diagnostic output without copying live secrets into the review. Check what the client retains in conversation history and traces. Secret scanning can help identify known patterns, but a clean scan is not proof that no secret exists.
Limitation: Runtime retrieval still returns a value to a process. In Gazebo's credential-release model, the runtime and its host receive the actual provider key. Whether the model also sees it depends on the client. Review that trust boundary before connecting a third-party runtime.
If a key has already been exposed, remove the copy and assess provider-side revocation or rotation; deleting the message or file alone is not enough. See what happens when you paste a key into an agent prompt.
2. Restrict provider permissions and retrieval separately
Action: Create the narrowest provider credential that supports the task: the right account, resources, operations and expiry where available. Separately allow the agent to retrieve only the stored credentials it needs.
Verify: Review the provider's configured permissions, then test a permitted retrieval and a denied retrieval using fictional data or a non-production credential. Where practical, verify that the provider itself rejects an operation outside the intended scope.
Limitation: Gazebo does not mint a narrower provider key when it returns a stored one. Its declared-method check is credential-release policy context, not enforcement of later HTTP requests. If the provider key allows writes, a GET retrieval declaration does not make it read-only.
3. Record successful and denied retrieval attempts
Action: Review credential-access records for agent identity, service, named key, declared method, time and outcome. Keep secret values out of the records. Maintain provider and runtime logs for investigations that need downstream activity.
Verify: Make one permitted request and one authenticated policy-denied request with a test credential. Confirm the expected records appear, with no key value included. Check the actual coverage and retention of your logging system rather than assuming every authentication failure is a credential-access event.
Limitation: Retrieval history answers who requested a key, not what they subsequently did with it. One retrieval may lead to many provider calls. A rise in retrieval count is not a measure of API traffic, spend or data access.
4. Revoke retrieval promptly; invalidate exposed provider keys too
Action: Revoke agent retrieval access promptly. If the runtime or provider key may be compromised, also restrict, revoke or rotate that key at the provider. Revoking Gazebo access does not invalidate a key already delivered.
Verify: After revocation, attempt a new retrieval with the old connection or token and confirm rejection. Separately verify provider invalidation when it is part of the incident response. Identify other workloads using a shared provider key before replacing it, without delaying necessary containment.
Limitation: Other Gazebo profiles can remain active after one is revoked, but rotating a provider key they share can still affect them. No revocation action undoes provider operations already completed.
Use rotation versus revocation to plan these as complementary controls, not competing alternatives.
5. Give independently managed agents separate identities
Action: Separate agents, owners and production versus test environments where their access needs or offboarding decisions differ. Do not share a Gazebo agent token merely because two clients run the same software.
Verify: Confirm that two test agents produce distinguishable retrieval records. Revoke one and check that the other can still perform its authorised retrieval.
Limitation: Separate retrieval identities do not automatically create separate provider credentials. If both agents receive the same key, provider logs may not distinguish their later requests, and invalidating that key affects both. Use separate provider keys when you need that isolation and the provider supports it.
6. Review access against the current task
Action: Record an owner, purpose and review date for each agent's access in your operational inventory. Remove unused permissions after checking whether the runtime is inactive, infrequently used or reusing a previously retrieved credential.
Verify: During a review, compare the task with the provider permissions, approved key names and recent retrieval history. Exercise any expiry settings you rely on; a review date in a checklist is not an automatically enforced expiry.
Limitation: No recent retrieval is not proof of no activity. A runtime may retain a valid key, and an infrequent job may legitimately need access. Check runtime and provider evidence before deciding.
Worked example: a reporting agent
This is an illustrative checklist, not a claim about a deployed customer:
- Task: Produce a report from one GitHub repository's issues.
- Provider boundary: Create a token restricted to the intended repository and the read permissions required for the report.
- Retrieval boundary: Give the reporting agent its own identity and approve only that stored key—not unrelated Stripe or production credentials.
- Test: Confirm allowed retrieval, denial of an unrelated credential, and the expected credential-access records.
- Review: Check the task and provider permissions with the owner. Use provider logs to investigate actual API activity.
- Offboarding: Revoke retrieval, stop the runtime, and invalidate its provider token if continued use must end.
Gazebo brings together agent profiles, selected-key OAuth approval and credential-retrieval history. It returns stored keys rather than proxying provider requests. The checklist remains useful with existing secrets infrastructure too: the important question is whether each control is implemented and verified, not which product label appears on it.