Quick answer: IAM for AI agents combines identity, authentication, permissions and enforcement across the systems an agent uses. Existing workload IAM remains relevant. Gazebo can add central management of credential retrieval, but the provider's permissions and the agent's execution environment determine what happens after a key is returned.
This is the architecture guide. For a policy-design worksheet, see AI agent permissions; for an operational reduction checklist, see least privilege for AI agents.
Start with the right boundaries
An identity identifies a principal, whether human or machine. A credential helps authenticate that principal. A role or policy describes permitted access. An enforcement point decides whether a particular request is allowed. These are related, but they are not interchangeable.
Cloud IAM roles, service accounts, workload federation and short-lived credentials already support non-human callers. An AI agent may use those controls directly. A person may also authorize an agent client's connection through an interactive OAuth flow; the agent need not handle the person's login itself.
The question is not whether traditional IAM works for agents. It is which system enforces which boundary when an agent can choose tools and encounter untrusted input. A shared provider key, for example, gives every holder its provider permissions. Naming several agent profiles above that key makes retrieval attributable by profile; it does not make the provider key narrower.
Threats worth designing for
- Excess permissions: a billing assistant that only needs subscription status receives a key that can also issue refunds.
- Prompt injection: text the agent reads tries to persuade it to use an allowed tool for a different purpose. Identity checks alone cannot establish the agent's intent.
- Credential exposure: a returned key may be available to the runtime and host and may enter model context or logs, depending on the client. Secure storage before retrieval does not remove this risk.
- Stale access: a one-off integration keeps a usable token after its owner or purpose has changed.
- Shared authority: several agents use one provider credential, making provider-side attribution and independent invalidation harder.
Different controls address different threats. Narrow provider credentials constrain later provider actions. Runtime isolation reduces access to other agents' tools and keys. Retrieval policies control which stored keys are released. Appropriate execution approval can pause a high-impact action where that action is actually performed; consent to retrieve a key is not approval of every subsequent operation.
Follow a request from identity to resource
Consider an agent that must read Stripe subscription information:
- Caller authentication: establish which client or workload is making the request. In Gazebo, this might be an agent token or an OAuth connection with approved named keys.
- Retrieval authorization: Gazebo checks the configured service and declared HTTP method for the requested key, then records the credential-retrieval decision.
- Delivery: on approval, Gazebo returns the stored provider credential to the client runtime and its host. Its release policy does not produce a new Stripe key with narrower provider permissions.
- Provider authorization: Stripe evaluates the key's actual permissions when a later API request arrives. A suitably restricted provider key matters even if retrieval was gated.
- Resource and task checks: if the workflow must limit access to one customer or require an operation approval, the system executing the provider request needs a trustworthy way to enforce those additional rules. A declared HTTP method alone cannot do it.
This is one integration model, not a requirement that every agent use a broker. If native workload identity and provider-side permissions already meet the need, an additional retrieval layer may add more setup than value. For several agents and services, centrally reviewing retrieval grants and events may be useful even when existing IAM remains the downstream authority.
Identity and authorization are lifecycle decisions
Assign a named identity to a meaningful consumer, protect its authentication material and document its owner. A separate identity can make retrieval or provider activity attributable at the system that sees it, provided clients do not share tokens or run with access to one another's credentials. Several identities may legitimately share a narrowly defined role; sharing that role does not make their credentials the same.
Review access when tasks or integrations change. Remove unused retrieval grants and provider permissions based on actual need and a justified cadence. A denied Gazebo request means the caller could not retrieve that key through that route; it is not evidence that all other credential paths are closed.
If a consumer is compromised, disable its future retrieval and isolate the affected runtime. Identify any provider keys already delivered, then restrict, invalidate or replace them at the provider when necessary. Revoking one Gazebo token does not invalidate copies of a provider key. If that key is shared with other legitimate consumers, plan their replacement rather than assuming they are unaffected.
Evidence comes from more than one log
Gazebo's credential-access history helps answer which authenticated retrieval identity requested which key, with what declared method, and what the retrieval outcome was. Its identity and history tools do not themselves create credential-access events. It does not record every subsequent provider operation, the records accessed, the user's task, or a complete multi-agent delegation chain.
For operation evidence, correlate appropriately protected retrieval records with runtime/tool logs and the provider's available activity records. Capture the necessary identity, request correlation, time and outcome without indiscriminately storing keys, full response bodies or sensitive customer data. A provider may record the use of a shared key without being able to distinguish the Gazebo identity that retrieved it.
Where approvals fit
Separate approval to retrieve a named key from approval to perform a consequential action. The first can be a Gazebo OAuth grant. The second needs to be bound to the proposed action and enforced by the tool, provider or gateway that actually performs it, before execution. A post-run reviewer may detect a mistake but cannot prevent an action already taken.
Approval makes sense for selected high-impact actions, not every request. Scope, provider restrictions and runtime controls still matter if an approved agent receives a broad credential.
A practical architecture review
For each agent or workload, ask:
- What authenticates it to each system, and who else can use that authentication material?
- Which service credential can it retrieve, and what can that provider credential actually do?
- Where are resource limits, operation approvals and tenant boundaries enforced?
- Can its runtime access another agent's tokens, tools or previously returned keys?
- Which logs show retrieval, which show provider activity, and what is not observable?
- What stops new retrieval, and what invalidates a key already delivered?
Use RBAC for AI agents to choose an authorization model, multi-agent credential management to examine delegation, and AI agent credential management for onboarding and offboarding.