Quick answer: AI agent credential management is the operating lifecycle for onboarding an agent, assigning its access, reviewing use, responding to incidents and removing access when it is retired. Every phase needs an owner, an action and evidence that the action worked.
This guide covers the lifecycle rather than the underlying components. Read secrets management architecture for AI agents for the storage and trust boundaries, or use the six-practice checklist to verify an existing setup.
Start with two different kinds of access
Retrieval access determines whether an agent may obtain a stored credential. Provider permissions determine what that credential authorises once received.
Gazebo manages the first: named agent identities, credential-release policies, selected-key consent for OAuth connections and credential-access records. Authorised retrieval returns the actual provider key to the runtime and its host. Gazebo does not proxy later provider calls, narrow the key's permissions or automatically make it short-lived.
This distinction prevents a common offboarding mistake: revoking a retrieval token while leaving an already-delivered provider key valid.
1. Onboarding: establish an owner and a limited purpose
Owner: The person responsible for the agent, with a service owner reviewing sensitive provider access.
Action: Record the task, environment and services required. Create a distinct retrieval identity and use provider-restricted credentials where available. For OAuth connections, approve only the stored key names the client needs. Review whether the runtime host is trusted to receive those values.
Evidence: Keep a non-secret access inventory showing the owner, intended use, provider restrictions and approved credentials. Test permitted retrieval and denial of an unrelated key using fictional data or a non-production credential. Confirm the expected retrieval records.
Do not confuse an inventory entry with an enforced control. A note that says “reporting only” does not prevent writes if the provider credential still allows them.
2. Routine review: compare access with the work being done
Owner: The agent owner, with a designated reviewer if your team requires one.
Action: Review active connections and profiles, provider permissions and the agent's continuing purpose. Remove access that is no longer needed. Choose a cadence appropriate to the sensitivity and frequency of the work rather than assuming every agent has the same review cycle.
Evidence: Record the review decision and any follow-up. Use credential-access history to see retrieval attempts; consult provider and runtime logs to establish actual requests, spend or data changes.
An agent that has not retrieved a key recently may still hold a valid copy. Conversely, an infrequent agent may legitimately need access despite having little activity. Ask the owner before treating inactivity as a complete answer.
3. Incident response: contain both retrieval and retained keys
Owner: The incident responder, coordinating with the provider credential owner.
Action: Disable further retrieval and stop or isolate the affected runtime where possible. If the runtime or provider key may be compromised, restrict, revoke or rotate that key at the provider. Check other systems that share it and coordinate replacement where needed.
Evidence: Confirm that the old Gazebo connection or token cannot retrieve again. Verify provider invalidation separately when required. Correlate retrieval records with provider and runtime evidence to investigate what happened.
A denied retrieval proves that new delivery was blocked; it does not prove the runtime can no longer call the provider with a cached key. See rotation versus revocation.
4. Offboarding: close every remaining access path
Owner: The agent owner and the relevant service owners.
Action: Revoke the retired agent's retrieval access, retire its runtime and remove unnecessary stored credentials. Invalidate dedicated provider credentials when their use should end. For a shared key, determine whether retained copies require rotation and identify the other consumers.
Evidence: Record the removal decision, test rejection of new retrieval and confirm provider revocation or expiry where applicable. Do not store the secret itself as evidence.
Keeping other retrieval profiles active avoids changing their Gazebo identities, but it does not eliminate dependencies on a shared provider key.
Illustrative example: coding and reporting agents
Suppose a coding agent needs one GitHub repository and a separate reporting automation needs Stripe data. This example describes two layers of configuration, not Gazebo-created provider scopes.
- At GitHub: Create an appropriately restricted token for the repository and the issue or pull-request permissions the coding task requires.
- At Stripe: Create a restricted credential for the reporting resources and read operations the automation needs. Verify the exact permissions in Stripe's current interface.
- In Gazebo: Store the credentials, create separate agent identities, and allow each to retrieve only its relevant key. For an OAuth connection, explicitly approve that key name.
- In each runtime: Use the supported retrieval integration and avoid persisting sensitive responses unnecessarily.
- During review: Inspect retrieval history centrally and use provider records for downstream activity.
- At retirement: Revoke retrieval and invalidate the dedicated provider credential if it should no longer be usable.
For implementation, use the SDK guide, CLI guide, API documentation or MCP guide, depending on the client. These integration paths reduce the need to build a separate credential-distribution interface for each agent.
Choosing tools without assuming an agent-specific gap
Existing secrets managers can support machine identities, policies and audit records. HashiCorp Vault, for example, supports AppRole machine authentication and access policies. Depending on the product and configuration, established infrastructure can also provide dynamic credentials, leases and deeper workload integration.
Provider-native restricted keys combined with your existing secrets infrastructure may be sufficient for one trusted agent. A platform team may already have the identity and review processes it needs.
Gazebo's potential advantage is a focused workflow for connecting agent clients, approving credential retrieval and reviewing access across services—not a capability that general-purpose infrastructure categorically lacks. That can become more useful as independently managed agents and services accumulate. It does not inherently solve runtime key exposure better than another credential-delivery system.
Plan for retrieval outages and expiry
A broker is a dependency for new retrieval, not necessarily for every provider call. If retrieval is unavailable, surface a clear error and pause or fail according to the task's requirements. Do not silently fall back to a broad, hardcoded key.
A runtime holding a still-valid credential may continue calling the provider. If you use provider-issued temporary credentials, check their actual expiry and renewal behaviour; Gazebo returning a stored key does not create that lifecycle automatically.
This makes availability planning part of credential management: know which jobs require a fresh retrieval, which can retain keys, and how either behaviour affects incident containment.
Independent editorial guidance; not affiliated with or endorsed by the tools mentioned. Last reviewed: November 2026. Verify product-specific features in the relevant provider's current documentation.