Quick answer: Zero trust avoids granting implicit access because a caller is “inside” a network or already owns a device. Authenticate and authorize appropriate access to resources using least privilege. Gazebo can verify credential retrieval for a named agent, but that check alone does not authorize or record every later provider operation.
For identity and policy definitions, see IAM for AI agents; for effective-permission tests, see least privilege for AI agents.
Zero trust is an architecture, not a token setting
NIST SP 800-207 describes no implicit trust based solely on network location or ownership. Its resource-focused approach evaluates the requester and relevant context before granting access, applies least privilege and considers security posture as conditions change.
An agent may run in a trusted network and still process untrusted instructions. A provider key may be valid while its runtime is compromised. Zero trust therefore asks where the resource-access decision happens—not merely whether a token was checked once by a vault.
It does not require a human MFA prompt for every machine call. Workload identities and sessions can participate; the decision and session boundaries should be appropriate for the resource. Browser-assisted OAuth can authorize an agent client's connection when user consent is needed. An agent does not need to become a human user to benefit from these controls.
Follow the enforcement points
| Boundary | What can be checked | What the check does not establish |
|---|---|---|
| Credential retrieval | Authenticated Gazebo identity, permitted service and declared method, approved named key where applicable | The endpoint, customer record or operation later called with the key |
| Runtime/tool execution | Tool permissions, caller context, task approval, environment isolation if actually implemented | Provider permissions unless the tool also enforces them |
| Provider/resource access | Provider identity/key scope, project, role and resource policy | The agent's intended task unless trustworthy task context is carried and enforced |
For a supported Gazebo request, the stored provider credential is returned to the runtime and host. Its release decision can be logged. Later provider requests can proceed with that key outside Gazebo, and a previously delivered copy may outlive the Gazebo grant. Credential retrieval is a useful boundary, not a complete zero-trust deployment.
Worked example: a deployment assistant
Suppose a Cursor assistant reads PRs and prepares a staging deployment. Give it an appropriate GitHub identity with access to the intended repository, and evaluate a Vercel project-scoped token for the staging project if its actual API calls work with that scope. Keep production authorization separate at the provider. Test the intended operations and a request to an out-of-scope project.
Gazebo may let the assistant retrieve only the configured GitHub and Vercel keys through its profile. It does not turn either key into an endpoint-specific token or guarantee that only staging can be changed if the underlying credential also permits production. Avoid claiming pulls:read or env:write are Gazebo operations; check the provider's actual permission settings.
If the assistant is manipulated by untrusted PR text, it may still use actions allowed by its provider credentials and tools. An approval at the executing tool can protect a high-impact deployment before it runs. Reviewing the result afterward is useful for detection, not prevention. Neither zero trust nor approval automatically makes prompt injection impossible.
Assume a credential can be copied
Separate named identities are useful when each actual caller protects its own authentication material. If multiple agents share one runtime or one provider key, they may share effective authority despite having separate Gazebo profiles. Revoking a profile stops new retrieval through that identity; assess runtime copies and provider-side invalidation when responding to a compromise.
An attacker who obtains a shared key can potentially use its permissions; this does not mean every other machine using the key is itself compromised. Containment depends on the key's provider scope, expiry, downstream controls and availability to the affected runtime.
Review what you can actually observe
Review identities, provider permissions, runtime tools and dependencies on a cadence justified by their risk. Gazebo's history can help identify recent retrieval of service credentials; it cannot automatically say which provider services were called, how many records were touched or whether a cached key remains in use. Use appropriately protected provider and runtime evidence for those questions.
Least privilege is not an optional extra to zero trust: permission decisions should also limit access to what is needed. No one retrieval product, named token or four-item checklist alone demonstrates conformance to a complete zero-trust architecture.
For a practical permission worksheet, read AI agent permissions. For credential lifetime and incident response, read AI agent credential management.