Quick answer: Sharing a provider API key makes agents harder to distinguish and independently offboard. Give each independently managed agent its own retrieval identity, restrict the provider credentials it can obtain, and keep records of retrieval. A separate identity does not change the permissions of a key already delivered.
Start with three different things
An agent identity identifies the caller to your access system. In Gazebo, an agent token or authorised OAuth connection lets the service check who is requesting a credential.
A retrieval policy determines which stored credentials that caller may receive. OAuth connections also require explicit approval of the stored key names.
A provider credential is the actual Stripe key, GitHub token or other value the runtime uses at the provider. The provider determines what that credential authorises.
These are related but not interchangeable. Giving a client a Gazebo identity does not turn a broad provider key into a narrow one.
What is credential blast radius?
Blast radius is the potential impact of misuse or compromise. It depends on the permissions, resources and validity of the credential—not whether the actor is called an agent.
A provider token limited to one repository exposes less than an organisation-wide administration token. Read-only access can still expose sensitive data. Restricting operations is useful, but does not make every permitted operation harmless.
When agents share a provider key, invalidating that key can affect every consumer. When they also share a retrieval identity, it becomes harder to distinguish who requested the key or disable future retrieval for just one caller.
A beginner setup
- Name the caller and its purpose. Separate production from test, and separate agents that have different owners or offboarding decisions.
- Restrict credentials at the provider. Use the narrowest supported operations, resources and lifetime for the task.
- Approve only necessary retrieval. Do not give a reporting agent access to unrelated deployment or billing keys.
- Check what the runtime receives. Gazebo returns the actual stored provider credential to the runtime and its host. Whether it enters model context or logs depends on the client.
- Test removal before you need it. Verify that revoking retrieval rejects a new request. Separately know how to invalidate a provider key already received.
Existing workload-identity and secrets-management infrastructure can support these principles too. Evaluate the workflow rather than assuming general-purpose tools cannot identify machines.
Illustrative example: a billing report
Suppose a reporting agent needs selected Stripe data. This is an example, not a description of a deployed customer.
At Stripe: Create and verify a restricted credential for the report's required resources and read operations. Do not assume a customer-level restriction exists unless Stripe supports it for your chosen interface.
In Gazebo: Create a reporting identity and allow retrieval of only that stored credential. Its declared-method policy is a check before release; it does not inspect later Stripe requests.
In the runtime: Retrieve the key through the supported integration. Treat the returned value as sensitive and avoid unnecessary persistence.
In an investigation: Gazebo's log can show that the reporting identity requested the credential. Use Stripe and runtime records to establish actual API calls.
If the key permits a write, the retrieval identity alone cannot prevent the runtime from making that write. Change the provider permissions or use an architecture that controls actual requests.
What happens when the agent is retired?
Revoke its Gazebo access to stop future retrieval, retire the runtime, and invalidate a dedicated provider key if its remaining use should end. If the key is shared, assess retained copies and plan replacement with the other consumers.
Retrieval revocation leaves other profiles intact. It does not erase a key from a runtime or make copies unusable at the provider.
Gazebo's potential advantage is a focused workflow for connecting agent clients, approving credential retrieval and reviewing access across services. It does not remove the need for provider permissions or trusted runtimes.
For the broader identity model, read IAM for AI agents. For the underlying boundaries, see the secrets architecture guide. For offboarding decisions, use rotation versus revocation.